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AbstractMany important traits of state legislatures vary across chambers within a state. Yet according to existing typologies in the comparative study of bicameralism, the 49 bicameral American state legislatures would be deemed quite homogeneous. To resolve this disjuncture, I identify a novel dimension of bicameralism that distinguishes among state legislatures by capturing the extent to which the two chambers serve as meaningfully different venues for influence. Based on this framework, I develop an index of bicameral "distinctiveness" rooted in three traits that speak to policy influence across chambers: the ratio of seats, bipartisan representation, and constituency dissimilarity. This measure reveals sizable variation across states and a conspicuous geographic pattern, with considerably greater bicameral distinctiveness in the Eastern United States. In turn, I assess the construct validity of this measure, showing how patterns of second chamber bill amendment vary systematically with the level of bicameral distinctiveness.

For legislators without legislative experience, credibility can be vital to achieving legislative success, and expertise from one's professional background is a highly plausible source of such credibility. For example, when legislating in policy areas directly related to one's previous occupation, a legislator's colleagues may perceive policy instruments as more informed by expertise rather than ideological preferences. In this paper, I focus on several questions related to the linkage between professional background and legislative success, and specifically, the ability to guide authored bills through the legislative process. First, does a match between a legislator's professional background and the topic of legislation make that legislation more likely to advance in the legislative process? Second, if so, does the importance of professional background dissipate as length of legislative service increases? Third, does the relevance of professional background systematically differ across types of legislators and legislatures? I find strong evidence that having a relevant professional background does lead to legislative success for new members, but that this pattern persists later in the legislative career too. Moreover, I find that these patterns are especially strong for minority party legislators and in legislatures with higher levels of membership turnover.

Innovative ideas often need champions to advocate for them. The study of policy innovation, however, has often focused on enactments rather than earlier stages of the legislative process, in which the actions of a bill's advocates may be especially crucial. In this paper, I ask who the champions of policy innovations are, focusing on two categories of legislators whose expertise makes them likely advocates: individuals with relevant professional backgrounds and individuals serving on relevant legislative committees. However, I also argue that the impact of expertise is conditional: as policies diffuse more widely, the role of expertise fades in importance, and champions can come from the broader legislative membership. To test these claims, I examine bill authorship and cosponsorship across 14 criminal justice policies between 1993 and 2004. I find that committee membership and professional background are indeed powerful predictors, but that their impact decreases as more states adopt the policy.

In this paper, I introduce a new dataset of individual-level professional background data for state legislators in 98 chambers from 1993 to 2012. Using this data, I examine trends in the professional backgrounds of state legislators over the period of the study, with attention to institutional factors such as professionalism and legislative turnover and individual-level factors such as political party and gender. In addition, I briefly illustrate three applications of the data. First, I analyze the extent to which district-level demographic and political factors affect the probability that a district will elect a legislator from certain backgrounds. Second, I examine the relationship between occupational background and ideology, identifying the backgrounds that identify moderate and extreme members in each party. Third, I contrast the occupational backgrounds of legislators who hold leadership positions with the membership at large. Taken together, these examples speak to some of the ways in which the composition of state legislatures can reveal interesting and relevant information underlying legislative behavior and institutions.

AbstractLegislative committees rely on the expertise and experience of their members, but instability in committee systems threatens the enhancements in productivity associated with specialization. This can occur in two ways, both of which are more common in state legislative committees than they are in Congress. First, membership retention on committees is generally lower, even after accounting for differing levels of legislative turnover across legislatures. Second, many state legislative committee systems undergo reorganization between sessions, changing the policy jurisdictions, and, therefore, the applicability of members' previously developed expertise. In this article, I examine the consequences of these two sources of committee instability on legislative output in 14 state legislatures. I find that both membership retention and jurisdictional reorganization significantly affect the number of bills processed through committees and the number of bills ultimately enacted. These linkages are also conditioned on several committee and institutional factors, particularly legislative turnover. Last, I find a weaker but discernible effect of membership retention on committees' propensity to perform their gatekeeping role.

In recent decades, observers of Congress have devoted increasing attention to the phenomenon of the revolving door, whereby members of Congress and staffers go on to careers in lobbying. This practice raises a number of normative concerns that are perhaps most heightened when it comes to the lobbying activities of members of Congress themselves. In this article, I examine the factors determining which former members go through the revolving door, and find that members with central network positions and highly effective legislators are more likely to become lobbyists. I then examine the extent to which members-turned-lobbyists have an impact on bills in Congress. I find evidence that lobbying by former members increases a bill's probability of progressing and some evidence that highly effective legislators also go on to become more effective lobbyists. Taken together, these findings support conventional wisdom that former members become some of the most influential lobbyists.

AbstractState legislative elections are increasingly shaped by two factors that influence the prospects of winning a majority: the redistricting cycle and partisan tide elections. Winning control of the redistricting process offers the prospect of shaping elections for the next decade, making majority status significantly more valuable than it otherwise might be. Partisan tides, on the contrary, can dramatically alter perceptions of which seats are safe or vulnerable and of whether majority status is obtainable or not. In this article, I examine how the proximity of redistricting and the presence of partisan tides are reflected in the strategies of the party organizations that contest state legislative elections. Using party finance data from 29 states during the period from 1996 to 2010, I find that parties' majority-seeking behavior is more intense in states with legislative redistricting, when redistricting is imminent, and when partisan tides favor the minority party.

Committee jurisdictions are important in legislative organization, but the reorganization of jurisdictions has received scant attention, particularly in state legislatures, where the fluidity of committee organization allows us to examine rationales for change. In this article, I examine whether new majorities use jurisdiction reorganization for agenda‐control purposes. Examining 39 state legislatures between 2003 and 2012, I test whether committee patterns are less stable in legislative sessions under new majorities and the extent to which reorganization reflects party priorities. I find that new majority parties eliminate committees that reflect the other party's policy priorities and create committees that reflect their priorities.

Scholars often identify gerrymanders by examining changes to districts' partisan composition. However, advantages can also be gained by systematically varying the extent to which incumbents' constituencies remain the same. In this article, I examine the post‐2000 redistricting in 22 state legislatures. I find that parties, particularly in legislatures with low turnover levels, gain advantages from constituency manipulation, but that these advantages are counteracted by geographic redistricting regulations. Lastly, I find that ostensibly bipartisan outcomes nonetheless feature partisan constituency manipulation. These findings echo a growing literature that analyzes the geographic aspects of gerrymandering and highlight how turnover patterns motivate redistricting strategies.

Studies of ambition often frame decisions to run for reelection, seek higher office, or retire in terms of the nature of those opportunities and the risks associated with them. However, career decisions can also be framed in terms of the value of one's present position, which depends on what we refer to as institutional attachments. In contrast to institutional positions (leadership, committee chairs), institutional attachments relate to social position in the legislature. In this article, we explore how factors related to institutional attachments influence career decisions. Specifically, we ask whether a legislator's cohort, including its size, compatibility, and experience in possessing majority status affect the propensity to exhibit static ambition. Looking at a sample of more than 5500 state legislative open‐seat opportunities in 47 states between 2003 and 2016, we find some but not all these traits are predictive of career decisions.

Scholars of redistricting often discuss "communities of interest" as a guideline for drawing districts, but scholarship offers little guidance on how citizens construe communities and interests in the context of representation. In this article, we seek to better understand how citizens' perceptions of people and places affect preferences regarding representation. Using an original survey conducted in 15 Massachusetts communities, we explore whether citizens have meaningful preferences about the communities with whom they share the same representative. To the extent they do, we test whether these preferences are driven by geographic considerations or other factors such as partisanship, race, and socioeconomic status. Our findings not only offer the opportunity to refine the concept of "communities of interest" to account for voter preferences but also more broadly speak to the literature on the increasingly political nature of residential preferences and their impact on political attitudes, participation, and voting behavior.